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Abstract 
 
The current literature is inconclusive on the relative importance of foreign and domestic factors in 
bringing about the Austrian financial crisis in 1931. This paper offers new data to bring further clarity 
to this issue and emphasises the importance of a domestic factor: universal banks’ exposure to 
industrial enterprises. Industrial enterprises were the universal banks’ main borrowers and creditors. 
During the 1920s they did not perform well, and made the universal banks insolvent. The Credit-
Anstalt, which became an ‘acquirer of last resort’ for weak universal banks during the 1920s, may have 
avoided its own demise had it been spared of one bank’s, the Unionbank’s assets. 
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THE AUSTRIAN BANKING CRISIS OF 1931 
ONE BAD APPLE SPOILS THE WHOLE BUNCH 
Flora Macher 
f.macher@lse.ac.uk 
The current literature is inconclusive on the relative importance of foreign and 
domestic factors in bringing about the Austrian financial crisis in 1931. This paper 
offers new data to bring further clarity to this issue and emphasises the importance 
of a domestic factor: universal banks’ exposure to industrial enterprises. Industrial 
enterprises were the universal banks’ main borrowers and creditors. During the 
1920s they did not perform well, and made the universal banks insolvent. The 
Credit-Anstalt, which became an ‘acquirer of last resort’ for weak universal banks 
during the 1920s, may have avoided its own demise had it been spared of one 
bank’s, the Unionbank’s assets. 
 
The role of banks in bringing about crises has recently received renewed interests. What we have 
re-learned since 2007 is the banking system’s enormous ability to hide insolvency behind 
liquidity. Even though banks may carry non-performing, perhaps ‘sub-prime’ loans, they can still 
continue to operate as long as they are liquid, and there is no regulator who would force them to 
write off these assets and raise new capital. It is hence theoretically possible that the number of 
defaulted borrowers only reveals itself once the crisis has already erupted. This has been 
particularly problematic during the Great Recession in the United States and researchers have 
identified the same problem in the context of the Great Depression of the United States.
1
 This 
paper shows that a Central European country had the same experience in 1931. 
The debacle of Austria’s largest bank, the Credit-Anstalt (CA), was a global turning point 
in the Great Depression. The CA’s losses were publicly announced on 11 May 1931, and in the 
following months not only Austria, but several other countries in Central Europe and beyond 
experienced financial distress. The gold exchange standard began to disintegrate, the international 
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flow of goods and capital became hindered by emerging trade and exchange system blocs, and 
what was previously a global recession deepened into a prolonged depression.
2
 
What factors led to 11 May 1931? The historiography offers a number of explanations for 
the distress of the CA and the Austrian banking sector. One argument places the Austrian story 
into an international context and posits that the flight of foreign creditors played a pivotal role in 
bringing about the banking crisis.
3
 On the other hand, there are explanations which emphasize the 
domestic nature of the crisis.
4
 
The purpose of this paper is to reassess the arguments of the historiography regarding the 
causes of the Austrian crisis in 1931 in light of new data compiled for this research. The paper 
presents two micro-level datasets. One includes the balance sheets and profit and loss statements 
of the financial system between 1925 and 1933, bank-by-bank. This dataset covers approximately 
300 financial institutions for each year. The purpose of this dataset is to obtain a clear overview 
of the whole financial system, how it evolved in the years preceding the crisis, and how important 
foreign creditors were in sustaining this banking system. The other database incorporates the 
balance sheets and profit and loss statements for the ‘Konzerns’, in other words, the industrial 
network of four universal banks. These four banks - the Verkehrsbank (VB), the Unionbank 
(UB), the Boden-Credit-Anstalt (BCA), and the CA - were the universal banks, which 
experienced distress
5
 between 1925 and 1931. This dataset includes approximately 160-80 
enterprises for each year. The purpose of this collection is to uncover the extent to which the 
Konzern, the heart of the universal bank, contributed to the distress of these four banks. 
These data sources together allow a close insight into the factors that contributed to the 
failure of the VB, the UB, and the BCA in the 1920s, and the reasons that had led to the CA’s 
application for state support on 8 May 1931, and eventually to the demise of the Austrian banking 
system in 1931. 
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The paper is structured as follows. The next section offers an overview of the historical 
context and the existing literature which is followed by an overview of the banking system. 
Afterwards, I discuss the financial system’s exposure to foreign creditors, which is followed by 
the analysis of the sector’s domestic creditors. Next, I assess the performance of the Konzerns of 
the four universal banks that discontinued their operations, and subsequently demonstrate that the 
Konzerns were at the heart of each bank’s demise. The final section concludes. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was on the losing side after World War I and the Peace Treaties 
dismembered the Empire and deprived Austria of approximately two-thirds of its territory and 
population. The country was also liable to paying reparations to compensate the winners for their 
war losses and, since its assets were used as collateral against the reparations, the country could 
not borrow. In the immediate post-war period, the state hence resorted to using the printing press 
of the central bank to finance the expenses arising from the dislocation caused by the war. 
 The state’s excessive reliance on central bank financing produced hyperinflation in the 
first two years of the 1920s. When the situation became untenable, the help of the League of 
Nations was sought and the economy was stabilized through a large foreign loan arranged by the 
international organization. The loan was conditional on a reconstruction scheme overseen by the 
League which implemented a new currency, the Austrian Schilling (AS), established an 
independent central bank, the Austrian National Bank (ANB), and, through very strict 
surveillance measures, ensured a balanced government budget.
6
 By 1924 Austria was back on its 
feet and its economy was guided by contemporary liberal economic tenets: a currency fixed to 
gold, free capital mobility, fiscal stringency, and a restrictive central bank. 
What followed the stabilization was, according to the historiography, a ‘borrowing binge’. 
The Austrian state as well as its banking system excessively exposed themselves to short-term 
foreign creditors during the second half of the 1920s.
7
 Banks borrowed short-term and in foreign 
currency and extended these resources to Austrian industry as long-term loans denominated in 
Austrian Schillings, thereby generating currency and maturity risks. Authors argue that, due to 
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Central Europe’s high levels of indebtedness, foreign creditors had been doubtful about the 
stability of Central European currencies even before the announcement of the CA’s weak 
financials on 11 May 1931.
8
 When the largest Austrian bank’s losses became known, foreign 
creditors started fleeing the financial system and the currency and maturity mismatches produced 
gaping holes in banks’ balance sheets and brought about their demise. ‘In Britain, Germany, 
Austria, and Hungary alike, the withdrawal of foreign deposits was the catalyst for the financial 
crisis that shattered the gold standard system.
9
 
The historiography also blames the fragility of Austrian financial institutions on a peculiar 
organizational structure, the universal bank, inherited from the period of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire and familiar to researchers of the German financial system.
10
 Austria’s largest financial 
institutions were universal in a sense that they combined commercial and investment banking 
activities as they were lenders as well as owners of industrial enterprises. Their links to industry 
had originated in the pre-1914 period and they all had their own Konzern: an industrial network 
into which the banks were invested either as shareholders or lenders, but in the majority of the 
cases, as both.
11
 Most of Austrian industrial joint-stock corporations were under the majority 
ownership of one of the Austrian universal banks.
12
 World War I and the subsequent years of 
hyperinflation further cemented the connections as banks converted much of their industrial loans 
into equity in order to preserve the value of their invested capital in the face of ever-rising 
prices.
13
 The strengthening tie between banks and industry, nevertheless, had serious 
repercussions. Authors argue that the stabilization arranged by the League of Nations brought 
about ‘no real recovery after 1924’14 and hence Austrian universal banks were exposed to the 
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‘fitful performance’ of industry.15 This reduced banks’ profitability, and the loans provided to the 
Konzerns tied up financial institutions’ capital that otherwise could have sought more profitable 
enterprises. 
Another explanation blames Austrian universal banks’ vulnerability on their excessive 
expansion to the non-Austrian geographies of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.
16
 Prior to World 
War I, Austrian universal banks were market leaders not only within Austria but across the whole 
territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Peace Treaty of St. Germain, however, 
erected a wall across these connections in the form of new borders and, due to nostrification laws, 
the assets of the Austrian universal banks were exposed to the threat of confiscation. Despite the 
changes, Austrian universal banks sought to rebuild and maintain their former sphere of business 
influence. However, the pursuit of the ‘Danubian strategy’ had become increasingly burdensome 
for the large Viennese universal banks and required substantial investment. At the same time, it 
also promised low returns because Austrian banks’ affiliates could only compete in the ‘lemon’ 
segment abroad, which then increased the banks’ non-performing loan portfolio.17 
Finally, some have pointed out that management and organizational problems at the CA, 
led to chaotic reporting and bad decision-making and this led to the bank’s collapse in 1931.18 
The literature has extensively assessed the causes of this crisis but does not provide clear 
guidance on the relative importance of the various factors that played into Austrian banks’ 
distress. It is hence uncertain to what extent the crisis was due to the insolvency of the banking 
system resulting from domestic factors, rather than a liquidity crisis due to the flight of foreign 
capital. Schubert argues in connection with the CA’s distress that the departure of foreign 
creditors was the fundamental cause for the CA’s illiquidity, while the other factors explain the 
bank’s insolvency.19 The paper provides new data to re-assess these arguments not only in 
connection with the CA but also regarding the other universal banks that experienced distress in 
the 1920s, the VB, the UB, and the BCA. 
My databases help me assess the impact of the universal banking structure and the flight 
of foreign creditors on these four banks’ insolvency and illiquidity. I will demonstrate that these 
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four universal banks were insolvent as far back as 1925. The reason behind their insolvency was 
the weak performance of their industrial network, their Konzerns. My analyses also reveal that 
the CA’s absorption of the weak assets of the other three universal banks directly contributed to 
the CA’s demise. The three universal banks that disappeared through the years from 1926 to 1929 
were not equally weak. There was one bad apple among them, the UB, whose Konzern had an 
unsustainably high debt level, was loss-making, and its performance was deteriorating from 1925. 
In comparison and in absolute terms as well, the Konzerns of the VB, the BCA, and the CA were 
in a much better condition and were on an improving trend. This suggests that if the CA had been 
spared of the UB’s assets, it may have survived. 
Evidence on the four banks’ liquidity is less conclusive than on their insolvency due to 
data limitations. The available data confirm that no foreign creditor flight occurred before the 
announcement date of the four banks’ distress. If the banks were illiquid before this date, it was 
due to a domestic creditor flight, resulting from the deterioration of their Konzern. Regarding the 
CA, it is unclear whether the bank was illiquid on 8 May 1931 when it turned to the ANB for 
help. It is, however, certain that after this date, the flight of both foreign and domestic creditors 
generated an enormous liquidity pressure on this bank. 
OVERVIEW OF THE BANKING SYSTEM 
I have collected the balance sheets and profit and loss statements of Austrian joint-stock financial 
institutions, bank-by-bank from 1925 until 1933.
20
 The dataset is the product of primary research 
based on a contemporary statistical publication, the Financial Compass. The Financial Compass 
offers a description of the activities of financial institutions (similarly to an annual report) as well 
as their financial statements. 
Table A1 in the Appendix shows that in the Financial Compass published in 1926, there 
were 398 individual financial institutions and of these, 284 reported their financial statements, 
while 114 only provided limited information on their operation. As the table makes clear, 
financial institutions’ reporting behaviour improved towards the end of the period under 
observation and in the 1931 publication there were only 22 non-reporting entities. The 
institutions that did not report their financials were predominantly small operations which ended 
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up falling into distress, were merged into competitors, or were liquidated. Table 1 provides an 
overview of the number of financial institutions that are in the final database. Table A2 in the 
Appendix assesses the representativeness of this database and demonstrates that this compilation 
improves on the comprehensiveness of previous data collections. 
 
Table 1 The number of financial accounts in the bank database 
                    
 
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
Balance sheet 276 269 274 311 318 314 315 312 309 
Universal bank 8 8 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 
Other bank 44 40 37 36 32 30 30 29 25 
Mortgage bank 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 10 10 
Savings bank 216 213 223 261 272 271 271 268 269 
Profit and loss statement 267 261 268 303 315 310 311 306 293 
Universal bank 8 8 6 6 5 5 4 4 4 
Other bank 39 37 35 33 31 29 29 27 18 
Mortgage bank 8 8 7 8 8 8 9 10 9 
Savings bank 212 208 220 256 271 268 269 265 262 
 
Unquestionably, these financial statements were in some respect guilty of 
misrepresentation, but if we read them with attention to such risks, they can be effectively relied 
on to construct a comprehensive overview of the financial system. Schubert has pointed out that 
the misleading attribute of these accounts is that they represent non-performing loans as solid, 
profit-producing assets.
21
 This paper also finds and explains later that Viennese banks booked 
interest on loans even if they did not actually receive that interest. If the financial statements are 
analysed by taking into consideration these caveats, they can provide very useful information. 
This study draws conclusions only based on data that can be reasonably relied on and specifically 
points out when data should be handled with care. 
Table 1 shows that there were four main types of Austrian joint-stock financial 
institutions during the interwar period: universal banks, Sparkassen (savings banks), mortgage 
banks, and other banks. Figure 1 illustrates the growth of the sector’s total assets by type of 
financial institution. In 1930, total assets were 83 per cent higher than in 1925. In 1925, they 
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amounted to 37 per cent of the nominal GDP, while the same ratio in 1930 was a whopping 60 
per cent.
22
 These figures imply the financial system’s dynamic growth following the stabilization. 
Mortgage banks experienced the most vigorous advance during this period by expanding 
their assets almost five-fold. However, their overall share within the whole sector continued to 
remain minor, at around 6-10 per cent. On the contrary, other banks were the weakest performers. 
These institutions experienced a decline in 1926 and 1929 and the overall increase in their total 
assets from 1925 to 1930 was only 22 per cent. These players were also small at the aggregate 
level: they made up only 7-8 per cent of the sector’s total assets. 
 
Figure 1 The structure and growth of the Austrian financial system by total assets 
 
 
 
      
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       Source: the author's calculations based on Financial Compass, 1925-32. 
   
Of the two large players, universal banks and Sparkassen, the latter grew more 
dynamically during the period. Sparkassen increased their total assets by over 160 per cent from 
1925 to 1930, whereas the same figure for the universal banks was only 49 per cent. As a result, 
Sparkassen were continuously increasing their share within the sector as well, from 25 per cent in 
1925 to 37 per cent in 1930. While in the years preceding the crisis universal banks were still the 
dominant players of the sector, this changed from 1932. In this year, universal banks and 
Sparkassen contributed 33 and 46 per cent to the total assets of the whole sector, respectively. 
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This was a significant deterioration in universal banks’ position, whose total assets in 1925 made 
up 60 per cent of those of the whole sector. Nonetheless, it is also notable that while the number 
of universal banks declined from eight to five during the period, the number of Sparkassen 
increased from 216 to approximately 270 (Table 1). Therefore, despite their dynamic expansion 
over the years at the aggregate level, individual Sparkassen remained small vis-a-vis the 
enormous universal banks. 
 
Figure 2 The equity and liability side of universal banks' and Sparkassen's aggregate balance 
sheet 
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      Source: the author's calculations based on Financial Compass, 1925-32. 
   
Universal banks and Sparkassen differed in other respects as well. Figure 2 compares the 
equity and liability side of the aggregate balance sheet of these two players. The diagrams 
illustrate that universal banks and Sparkassen raised their financing from different sources. 
Sparkassen relied almost exclusively on depositors. Universal banks, on the other hand, raised 
only a minor part, 4-12 per cent of their financing from depositors and relied instead on current 
account balances. Depositors were predominantly private individuals who placed their savings at 
the bank and were not transacting with those monies. They were simply collecting their savings 
at the bank. Current account balances, on the other hand, were predominantly the bank accounts 
of businesses, were deposited via money transfers, not cash, and were heavily transacted.
23
 Figure 
2 thus confirms that Sparkassen were retail banks, whereas universal banks were essentially 
commercial banks. 
FOREIGN CREDITORS 
The literature argues that foreign creditors played a critical role in the 1931 crisis.
24
 Therefore, 
the importance of foreign creditors in the financing of the banking system will now be reviewed. 
The first diagram of Figure 3 illustrates the share of foreign creditors within the aggregate 
balance sheet of the banking system. At the height of the financial system’s foreign exposure in 
1927, financing provided by foreign creditors amounted to AS 836 million and its share in 
Austrian banks’ total financing was 16 per cent. This figure declined to nine per cent in 1929 and 
remained at that level in 1930. This suggests that the predominant portion of the banking 
system’s financing, 82 per cent in 1930, originated from domestic sources. 
Unfortunately, the data source does not disclose which type of financial institutions and to 
what extent was exposed to foreign creditors. However, it can be safely assumed that the 
predominant portion, if not all, of foreign creditors can be assigned to the universal banks. Since 
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individual mortgage banks and other banks were small and focused on local lending, they were 
probably not recipients of foreign credits. Further, as Figure 2 has shown, Sparkassen’s financing 
was built mainly of deposits, which were the cash savings of private individuals, and were, 
therefore, in all likelihood, domestic in origin. The remaining 4-5 per cent of other liabilities on 
Sparkassen’s balance sheet could theoretically have been foreign creditors. However, since 
Sparkassen were local financiers, for the sake of this investigation it is assumed that these 
liabilities were also domestic in origin. That is, subsequent analyses allocate all foreign creditors 
to the universal banks. 
 
Figure 3 Foreign and domestic liabilities 
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Source: the author's calculations based on Financial Compass; Financial Compass, 1928, p. 375; Financial 
Compass, 1929, p. 374; Financial Compass, 1930, p. 354; Financial Compass, 1931, p. 146-7, 274; ANB 
Mitteilungen, 1926-33; BoEA, file OV28/75, Cross deposits, 18 April 1932; Aguado‚ 'The Creditanstalt crisis‘, 
pp. 204-5; Weber, Vor dem groβen Krach‘, pp. 325-6, 342, 479. 
 
Following this assumption, the second diagram of Figure 3 shows the share of foreign 
creditors in the universal banks’ aggregate balance sheet. At the highest exposure in 1927, over a 
quarter of the universal banks’ financing came from foreign sources. In subsequent years, this 
ratio declined to approximately 17-8 per cent. That is, domestic liabilities constituted the 
dominant portion of universal banks’ external financing sources, approximately 70 per cent of the 
total from 1928. 
As the literature has pointed out, exposure to foreign creditors raises the risk of currency 
mismatch. If the universal banks were lending more in foreign currency than the volume of 
foreign currency financing sources made available to them, they incurred exchange rate risk. 
Table 2 examines this risk. It reports the volume of foreign creditors and the volume of foreign 
lending, and from these two, it calculates the foreign currency mismatch. In 1926 and 1927, 
institutions had more foreign currency liquidity than what they eventually extended as loans. 
From 1928, however, banks were granting more foreign currency loans than the volume of 
financing received from foreign creditors. In 1930, the mismatch amounted to AS 147 million. 
Should this be considered a high figure? Table 2 calculates how much of the central 
bank’s foreign reserves would have been needed to finance the banking system’s foreign 
currency mismatch. Table 2 also shows the gold cover
25
 in the extreme scenario when the ANB 
had had to be called on to finance the entire currency mismatch from its own reserves. In 1930, 
the gap in foreign lending and borrowing amounted to 15.8 per cent of the ANB’s reserves. Had 
the ANB had to fill in this gap from its reserves, the central bank’s coverage ratio would have 
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declined to 72.4 per cent in 1930. This figure is well above the legal minimum coverage ratio of 
33 1/3 per cent.
26
 
Nonetheless, to establish a precise picture of the foreign currency exposure of the banking 
system and the ANB’s ability to provide lender of last resort support, one more matter needs to 
be taken into consideration: cross-deposits. The cross-deposit scheme was designed by the ANB 
to provide support to the CA after its merger with the BCA, without hurting the central bank’s 
reserve backing. Through this mechanism, the CA received foreign currency credits from 
international banks while the latter obtained the same amount of credits from the ANB. Through 
this channel, the ANB indirectly provided foreign currency credits to the CA through the 
international banks.
27
 Since the ANB did not report the impact of these foreign currency credits 
on its books, presumably, neither did the CA.
28
 
 
Table 2 Foreign currency mismatch (million Austrian Schilling) 
            
 
1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 
Foreign creditors 685 836 649 566 611 
Foreign borrowers 535 662 728 741 758 
Foreign currency mismatch 150 174 -79 -174 -147 
Foreign currency mismatch/ANB reserves 22.1% 23.6% -9.9% -23.5% -15.8% 
ANB gold cover - adjusted for mismatch         72.4% 
Cross-deposits 
    
107 
Mismatch with cross-deposits/ANB 
reserves without cross-deposits
a)
 
    
-30.8% 
ANB gold cover - adjusted for mismatch 
and cross-deposits 
    
62.6% 
           
Note: The Financial Compass identifies these creditors and borrowers as financial institutions’ ‘ausländische 
Kreditoren’ and ‘ausländische Debitoren’. This stands for foreign creditors and borrowers but says nothing about the 
currency in which they were lending and borrowing. The analyses rest on the assumption that the transactions with 
these parties were carried out in foreign currency. a) Cross-deposits increase the foreign currency mismatch and also 
reduce the ANB's reserves. Their overall effect on the gold cover is hence double of their absolute value. 
Source: Financial Compass, 1928, p. 375; Financial Compass, 1929, p. 374; Financial Compass, 1930, p. 354; 
Financial Compass, 1931, p. 146-7, 274; ANB Mitteilungen, 1926-33; BoEA, file OV28/75, Cross deposits, 18 April 
1932; Aguado‚ 'The Creditanstalt crisis‘, pp. 204-5; Weber, Vor dem groβen Krach‘, pp. 325-6, 342, 479. 
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That is, Figure 3 and the calculations in Table 2 must be adjusted with the volume of 
cross-deposits. The total volume of cross-deposits is estimated around 15 million US dollars, 
which was AS 107 million.
29
 Figure 3 indicates that cross-deposits made up three per cent of the 
total assets of the universal banks in 1930. Table 2 calculates the foreign currency exposure 
arising from cross-deposits. The worst case scenario is when the full value of cross-deposits 
increases the foreign currency mismatch and, at the same time and to the same extent, it reduces 
the ANB’s reserves. If the ANB had had to support the universal banks in such a scenario, it 
would have lost 30.8 per cent of its reserves, and its coverage ratio would have declined to 62.6 
per cent, still well above the legal minimum. 
To further investigate the significance of foreign creditors, Figure 4 turns to the analysis 
of the annual change in the foreign creditors of the banking system. Universal banks - as long as 
the assumption holds that all foreign creditors can be allocated to them - received a capital inflow 
from abroad amounting to 7.1 per cent and 4.7 per cent of their total assets in 1926 and 1927, 
respectively. However, from 1928, the volume of foreign creditors declined sharply. The biggest 
drop of AS 187 million, or 5.4 per cent of the universal banks’ total assets, occurred in 1928. 
1929 continued with a fall of AS 83 million, 2.6 per cent of assets. The year before the crisis 
again saw an increase in foreign creditors of AS 45 million, 1.3 per cent of total assets. 
 
Figure 4 The annual change in the foreign creditors of the banking system 
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 BoEA, file OV28/75, Cross deposits, 18 April 1932; Aguado, ‘The Creditanstalt crisis‘, pp. 204-5; Weber, Vor 
dem groβen Krach‘, p. 479. 
205 
151 
-187 
-83 
45 
107 
-8.0%
-6.0%
-4.0%
-2.0%
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
Foreign creditors Cross deposits Share in total assets w/o cross deposits
15 
 
      
Source: Financial Compass, 1928, p. 375; Financial Compass, 1929, p. 374; Financial Compass, 1930, p. 
354; Financial Compass, 1931, p. 146-7, 274; ANB Mitteilungen, 1926-33; BoEA, file OV28/75, Cross 
deposits, 18 April 1932; Aguado‚ 'The Creditanstalt crisis‘, pp. 204-5; Weber, Vor dem groβen Krach‘, pp. 
325-6, 342, 479. 
 
These figures should again be adjusted with the impact of cross-deposits. Cross-deposits 
amounted to AS 107 million at the end of 1929. Afterwards they gradually declined by 1931 by 
approximately one-third. Since the exact timing of their departure is uncertain, it is assumed here 
that their volume did not change in 1930.
30
 If Figure 4 is adjusted accordingly, then the net 
change in foreign creditors is an AS 24 million increase in 1929. That is, cross-deposits turned 
the 1929 foreign currency outflow into a net inflow in 1929 which was followed by another AS 
45 million inflow in 1930. 
What do these analyses reveal about the foreign currency exposure of the banking system, 
and in particular, that of the universal banks, which, arguably, suffered from it? The figures lead 
to two findings. First, the ANB’s reserve backing was very strong. The central bank’s coverage 
ratio was around 90 per cent in the years preceding the crisis.
31
 The analyses demonstrate that in 
the absolute extreme scenario of all foreign creditors departing from the banking system, the 
ANB’s gold cover would have still been at the legal minimum. While in the middle of a crisis 
even such a strong reserve backing may prove insufficient, prior to the crisis it should give no 
concern to investors. Further, even if the banks did not offer an honest representation of their 
foreign currency mismatch and the figures were in fact higher than reported, these figures would 
have had to be three times higher to reduce the ANB’s coverage to below the legal minimum. 
This detail can explain why the Austrian crisis was a banking crisis at first, and became a 
currency crisis only afterwards. It can also account for the fact that Austria was the last among 
the three Central European countries to introduce capital controls in 1931. While Hungary and 
Germany stepped on this road in mid-July, Austria waited until 8 October.
32
 
Second, the figures also show that the fluctuations in foreign creditors were not 
significant when viewed as a ratio of the universal banks’ total assets, especially in the two years 
                                                          
30
 RAL, III/488 (a-c) Austria; BoEA, file OV28/75, Cross deposits; Assumption based on the author’s discussions 
with Dr. Nathan Marcus. 
31
 The author’s calculations based on ANB Mitteilungen, 1926-33. 
32
 Ellis, ’Exchange control’, pp. 30-7, 88-92. 
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preceding the crisis. Unfortunately, these annual figures may hide extreme volatility occurring 
during the year. Nonetheless, when these low annual fluctuations are considered together with the 
high reserve backing of the ANB, the two together suggest that had the universal banks been 
strong and healthy, they would have been able to survive the volatility of foreign creditors. The 
fact that, despite this background, four universal banks reported distress during this period, 
suggests that these banks were weak. The next sections thus explore whether this was the case. 
DOMESTIC CREDITORS 
Figure 3 has demonstrated the primary importance of universal banks’ domestic liabilities. These 
contributed approximately 70 per cent to universal banks’ capital sources from 1928. If 
depositors are removed from this aggregate, then the remaining 55-60 per cent remaining are the 
universal banks’ domestic current account balances. These will henceforth be referred to as 
universal banks’ domestic creditors. 
Who were these domestic creditors? There is only a limited number of players who could 
qualify for this category: the state (including any public authority), the ANB, other financial 
institutions, or the corporate sector, that is, the universal banks’ Konzerns. The state can be 
immediately excluded since it could not act as a direct lender to financial institutions.
33
 This 
leaves only three relevant options: the ANB, other financial institutions, and the Konzern. 
 
Figure 5 Rediscount from the central bank to the banking system 
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 BoEA, file OV28/32, Comments by Niemeyer to Reisch letter of 12/21/1926, 3 Jan. 1927. 
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931
Rediscount as a % of GDP Rediscount as a % of total assets of fin. system
17 
 
      
      
      Source: for the rediscount: ANB Mitteilungen, 1926-33; for the GDP: Kausel, Németh, and Seidel, 'Österreichs 
Volkseinkommen', p. 5; for the total assets of the financial system: the author's calculations based on Financial 
Compass, 1926-35. 
 
The ANB supported the financial sector by providing rediscount. Figure 5 shows the 
annual rediscount of the ANB. The data illustrate that in periods of tranquillity, the ANB’s 
rediscount was around 2-3 per cent of the financial sector’s total assets which translated to less 
than two per cent of the GDP. By way of comparison, the same figures for the Hungarian 
National Bank were around 6-10 per cent of the banking system’s total assets and 5-6 per cent of 
the national income.
34
 This suggests that the ANB did not excessively support the banking system 
and stepped up its intervention only in times of crisis. The ANB’s rediscount increased in 1929 
when the BCA collapsed, and in 1931 when the failure of the CA occurred and the whole of the 
financial system sank into distress. 
 
Figure 6 The asset side of Sparkassen's aggregate balance sheet 
   
 
 
      
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       Source: the author's calculations based on Financial Compass, 1925-32. 
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 The author’s own calculations based on Eckstein, National income, Table 1, p. 14; HNA, file Z12, bonds 60, 128-
9; Hungarian Compass, 1925/6-1934/5. 
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Another domestic creditor to the universal banks may have been other financial 
institutions. Among these only Sparkassen were substantially sizeable players to be able to act as 
a meaningfully large creditor to the even bigger universal banks. Figure 6 examines the asset side 
of Sparkassen’s balance sheet to pinpoint asset classes which were potentially placed at the 
universal banks. The analysis identifies an item called ‘bank receivables’ (Bankguthaben) which 
made up 14-23 per cent of Sparkassen’s assets.35 These receivables could be Sparkassen’s 
lending to the universal banks or other players of the financial system. This analysis makes the 
conservative assumption that all of Sparkassen’s bank receivables went to the universal banks.36 
The diagram of Figure 7 decomposes universal banks’ creditors into the main categories. 
Central bank rediscount accounted for four per cent of the universal banks’ total financing 
resources in periods of tranquillity and the figure seems to increase only in years of crisis.
37
 
Interbank lending generated some 6-17 per cent, while foreign creditors and cross-deposits were 
in the magnitude discussed earlier. The remaining portion, making up the largest part, 30-45 per 
cent of universal banks’ total assets, came from the corporate sector. Given that the universal 
banks owned a large portion of Austrian industry, this could not be any other source than their 
own industrial base. That is, universal banks’ most significant financier was these financial 
institutions’ very own Konzern. 
 
Figure 7 Universal banks' foreign and domestic creditors by creditor type 
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 Bank receivables are almost entirely missing from among the assets of the universal banks. The exceptions are the 
Zentral-Europäische Länderbank and the Mercurbank which held some bank receivables. Since these were foreign-
owned banks, it can be reasonably assumed that these were receivables from their affiliates (Financial Compass, 
1926-35). 
36
 What makes this assumption conservative is that it reduces the significance of the Konzern as a source of funding. 
This is however, not an unrealistic assumption as there is evidence that various Sparkassen were closely linked with 
various universal banks, for example the CA was connected to the Erste österreichische Spar-Casse (Financial 
Compass, 1927, p. 517). 
37
 Information is not available on the volume of individual banks’ reliance on the central bank’s rediscount. This 
analysis, therefore, assumes that all of the central bank’s rediscount went to the universal banks. What makes this 
assumption conservative is that it reduces the significance of the Konzern as a source of funding. 
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Source: the author's calculations based on Financial Compass, 1925-32; Financial Compass, 1931, p. 375; 
Financial Compass, 1929, p. 374; Financial Compass, 1930, p. 354; Financial Compass, 1931, p. 146-7, 274; 
ANB Mitteilungen, 1926-33; BoEA, file OV28/75, Cross deposits, 18 April 1932; Aguado‚ 'The Creditanstalt 
crisis‘, pp. 204-5; Weber, Vor dem groβen Krach‘, pp. 325-6, 342, 479. 
 
This phenomenon also explains an apparent oddity about the universal banks. They 
appear thinly capitalized throughout the period under observation with their equity at only 11-13 
per cent of their total assets which raises doubts about their ability to absorb the unreported losses 
that the literature claims they had to endure in the 1920s. However, if one views Konzern 
member accounts as quasi-equity, the universal banks were in fact very well capitalized and had 
enough funds to sustain several years of losses. To translate this mystery of solvency into an even 
bigger mystery of liquidity: if, as universally believed, these banks failed to collect interest on 
much of the loans they extended, how were they able to pay interest on their liabilities? In light of 
the finding that much of their funding came from their Konzern, the most likely interpretation is 
that even if universal banks had to book interest expenses on this Konzern funding, they did not 
actually have to make the payments on those payables. That is, the Konzern was standing on both 
sides of the universal banks’ balance sheets: the Konzern was receiving the loans on which 
interest was booked but not received and the Konzern was providing the dominant portion of the 
financing for the bank on which interest was booked but not paid. That is, the bank acted as a 
channel for its Konzern and Konzern financing acted as a source of cheap, or even free funding 
for the universal banks. 
KONZERN AND BANK SOLVENCY 
Previous paragraphs have analysed the financing resources of the universal banks, that is, the 
equity and liability side of their balance sheet, and have discussed the relative importance of their 
20 
 
foreign and domestic creditors. The following sections will now zoom in on the asset side of 
these banks’ balance sheet. 
There were eight universal banks in 1925 but by the end of the decade, only five remained 
(Table 1). Prior to 1931, three universal banks experienced distress. In 1927, the UB and the VB, 
and in 1930, the BCA disappeared.
38
 The first two were merged into the third, while three years 
later the BCA was absorbed by the largest universal bank, the CA. Finally, in 1931 the CA also 
collapsed. What happened to these banks? 
The analysis of universal banks’ assets and insolvency has so far been inhibited by the 
lack of data. Austrian universal banks misrepresented the assets on their balance sheets.
39
 They 
perpetuated the non-performing loans to their Konzerns and represented defaulted loans as 
healthy ones on their balance sheets. Further, the assets of the three universal banks that were 
merged during the 1920s, the VB, the UB, and the BCA, continued to be falsified after their 
absorption into another bank’s balance sheet. At none of these mergers were bad assets, that is, 
the delinquent loans of the failed banks’ Konzerns, fully written off. The predominant portion of 
bad loans were accepted at face value, as if they had been healthy, performing assets.
40
 There is 
thus no information on the volume of these banks’ non-performing loans. As explained above, it 
is also very likely that universal banks continued to book interest on their non-performing loans 
even when the interest was not received. They thereby falsified their net interest margin and thus 
made their profit and loss accounts unreliable regarding interest income and expenses. Thus a net 
interest margin based approach for the estimation of non-performing loans cannot be adopted 
here. Universal banks’ financial statements are, therefore, not useful for the analysis of their 
insolvency. 
Since the banks’ financial statements prevent a reliable assessment of their solvency, the 
investigation must reach out to the ultimate source: the financial accounts of the Konzerns 
themselves. The idea is to use the information on the performance of Konzern corporations as a 
basis, and from that make an inference on the quality of the universal banks’ assets. Since it can 
be safely assumed that the predominant portion of the universal banks’ assets were lent to or were 
                                                          
38
 The UB and the VB announced their merger with the BCA in 1926 and the effective date of these mergers was 25 
March 1927. The BCA announced its merger with the CA in 1929 and the effective date of this merger was 1 
January 1930. 
39
 Schubert, The Credit-Anstalt, p. 25. 
40
 At the UB-BCA merger 14.1 per cent of the total assets of the UB was written off as bad assets. The same figure 
for the VB-BCA and CA-BCA mergers was even lower, 5.7 per cent and 5.8 per cent, respectively. 
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invested into their Konzerns, the health of their Konzerns should be a reflection on the health of 
these banks’ assets. Indeed, the Konzern debt of the sample made up approximately 68 per cent 
per cent of the CA’s total lending in 1930.41 
I have hence built another micro-level database by collecting the balance sheets and the 
profit and loss statements for the period of 1925-30 of the Konzern corporations of the four 
universal banks that failed. The source was the Compass Kommerzielle Jahrbuch (Commercial 
Compass). The four Konzerns are that of the VB, UB, BCA, and the CA. Konzern members were 
identified based on the banks’ reporting in the Financial Compass.42 Table 3 provides an 
overview of this second micro-level database. 
                                                          
41
 The author’s calculation based on Commercial Compass, 1925-32. 
42
 As previously noted, the definition of the Konzern is vague and this paper adopts the assumption that Konzern 
members were those corporations for which the universal bank made such a claim. The companies of the four 
Konzerns were identified with the help of the following sources. For the CA: Financial Compass, 1927, pp. 371-5 
and 1931, pp. 278-81; For the BCA: Financial Compass, 1927, pp. 261, 263-8 and, 1931, pp. 270-1; For the UB: 
Financial Compass, 1927, pp. 421-2, 424-5; For the VB: Financial Compass, 1927, pp. 429-30. 
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Table 3 The number of financial accounts in the Konzern database 
                                      
 
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 
No. of years reported 2-6 1 Total 2-6 1 Total 2-6 1 Total 2-6 1 Total 2-6 1 Total 2-6 1 Total 
Coal, steel, machine 48 2 50 43 0 43 44 0 44 43 0 43 48 0 48 39 0 39 
Construction 7 0 7 8 0 8 8 0 8 7 0 7 7 0 7 6 1 7 
Chemical 7 1 8 7 0 7 7 0 7 6 0 6 7 0 7 7 0 7 
Diverse 21 0 21 19 1 20 24 0 24 23 0 23 23 0 23 22 0 22 
Electricity, water, gas 15 1 16 14 0 14 15 0 15 13 0 13 14 0 14 14 0 14 
Beverage 9 0 9 10 0 10 9 0 9 10 0 10 10 0 10 9 0 9 
Timber 8 0 8 8 0 8 9 1 10 8 0 8 8 0 8 7 0 7 
Shoe and leather 7 0 7 7 0 7 7 0 7 6 0 6 5 0 5 5 0 5 
Oil 3 1 4 2 0 2 2 0 2 3 0 3 2 0 2 1 0 1 
Paper 14 0 14 14 0 14 14 0 14 13 0 13 13 0 13 12 0 12 
Textile 17 3 20 20 0 20 20 0 20 17 0 17 17 1 18 13 0 13 
Transport 15 0 15 14 0 14 13 0 13 13 0 13 17 1 18 16 0 16 
Sugar 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 
Total 172 8 180 167 1 168 173 1 174 163 0 163 172 3 175 152 1 153 
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Table 4 Theoretical calculations for insolvency thresholds 
                           
 
Healthy Tier-1 Tier-2 
Debt 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Debt-to-profit ratio 5.0x  6.0x  7.0x  8.0x  9.0x  10.0x  11.0x  12.0x  13.0x  
Profit before financial expenses 20.0 16.7 14.3 12.5 11.1 10.0 9.1 8.3 7.7 
Interest 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 
Average term (years) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
  
  
      
  
Debt, beginning of period 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Interest payment 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Principal repayment 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Debt, end of period 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
  
  
      
  
Profit before financial expenses 20.0 16.7 14.3 12.5 11.1 10.0 9.1 8.3 7.7 
Interest expense 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Cash remaining for principal payment and distribution 12.0 8.7 6.3 4.5 3.1 2.0 1.1 0.3 -0.3 
Principal payment 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Cash remaining for distribution 2.0 -1.3 -3.7 -5.5 -6.9 -8.0 -8.9 -9.7 -10.3 
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A total of approximately 400 Konzern companies have been identified based on the four 
universal banks’ reporting. However, only approximately 160-180 companies actually reported a 
financial statement in any of the years between 1925 and 1930 in the Commercial Compass, on 
an annual basis. Those that did not report were presumably experiencing financial difficulties. 
Hiding financial distress through non-reporting was a common practice among banks as well as 
companies, and the authorities’ enforcement of regular reporting was ineffective. I also applied a 
restriction to the sample and included only those companies which supplied at least two financial 
statements for the six years under review. This excluded 14 companies. The purpose of this 
restriction was to gain some sense of dynamics for each company. Based on this, there are 
approximately 160-180 Konzern enterprises in the database for each year and, after all 
exclusions, these were most likely the best-performing Konzern members of the four universal 
banks. 
Levels of insolvency 
The abundant theoretical literature on banking crises provides guidance on the forthcoming 
analysis.
43
 Most of this literature analyses the liability side of banks in crisis, but this paper 
focuses on the deterioration of the asset side. In this regard, the analyses here are not concerned 
with ‘random withdrawals’ or the ‘asymmetric information’ between the bank and its 
depositors.
44
 Rather, the analyses investigate when the performance of underlying assets may 
make a bank insolvent and illiquid. The approach of this paper is hence closest to the theoretical 
model of Diamond and Rajan.
45
 
The paper distinguishes between three levels of bank insolvency based on the 
performance of the bank’s assets: (i) when bank borrowers stop servicing the principal on the 
loan from the bank (tier-1); (ii) when borrowers stop servicing part of the interest of the loan as 
well (tier-2); (iii) when borrowers stop generating sufficient interest and cash income to cover the 
bank’s most basic expenditures (tier-3). The bank is insolvent in all three cases but can remain 
liquid under tier-1 and tier-2 by restructuring, even effectively evergreening the existing loan, or 
by offering a new loan to the defaulter. A bank failure, however, becomes a tangible possibility 
                                                          
43
 E.g. Calomiris and Gorton, ‘The origins of banking panics’; Diamond and Dybvig, ‘Bank runs’. 
44
 Calomiris and Gorton, ‘The origins of banking panics’, p. 111. 
45
 Diamond and Rajan, ‘Liquidity shortages’. 
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under tier-2 and a virtually inevitable event under tier-3. This three-tier insolvency will be 
examined for the Austrian universal banks. 
Table 4 offers a simple calculation for the theoretical thresholds for the three-tier 
insolvency analysis. The table analyses various cases which only differ in the borrower’s level of 
indebtedness, as measured by the debt-to-profit ratio. The debt-to-profit ratio indicates how many 
years’ earnings are necessary for a company to fully repay its liabilities. If the ratio is high, the 
company has too much debt and/or insufficient profits to service the debt. Since the model 
assumes a constant debt level of 100, the various scenarios only differ in the underlying 
company’s profit generating potential. 
Assuming an eight per cent interest rate, a company enters tier-1 at 6x debt-to-profit.
46
 At 
5x debt-to-profit, the company has sufficient earnings to pay the interest and the principal due on 
the loan and, subsequently, it still has some money left to distribute to its own shareholders. At 
6x debt-to-profit, however, the company’s distributable earnings are negative, suggesting that it 
will stop servicing the principal of the loan. Between 6x and 12x debt-to-profit, the company is in 
tier-1, having less and less profits to service the principal but still having enough to make interest 
payments. At 13x debt-to-profit, however, the company enters tier-2 as it can no longer pay the 
interest due on the loan. That is, companies with a debt-to-profit ratio at or below 5x are healthy, 
those between 6-12x debt-to profit can still make interest but not principal payments, and from 
13x they default on the principal as well as on the interest of the loan.
47
 
What do these figures tell us about the solvency of the bank? From the perspective of the 
bank, a tier-1 corporate default is manageable, tier-2, however, threatens the existence of the 
bank itself. At tier-1 the bank is still earning the full interest of the loan and it is only the loan 
principal, that is, the bank’s capital, which is immobilized by the company’s non-payment. In this 
phase, the bank is already insolvent but it can still sustain its own operations from the interest 
payment. At tier-2, however, the bank is earning less interest than contractually determined, its 
net interest spread is lower than planned, and thus it faces the threat that its declining income may 
gradually prove insufficient to cover its own operational expenses. 
                                                          
46
 Based on the Statistische Nachrichten, the interest rate on short-term loans was around eight per cent in the period 
between 1926 and 1930. This is a conservative approach because long-term rates were probably higher. 
47
 The interest rate has been assumed based on the sources listed in Table 5. The limited principal payment (10-year 
loan) has been assumed because Konzern companies were very likely wholly or partially owned by the universal 
banks. 
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Table 5 Liquidity and solvency measures for the four Konzerns (million Austrian Schilling) 
                 
Panel 1 - The aggregate debt-to-profit ratio 
      
  
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 
  Actual debt-to-profit - aggregate for four Konzerns 18.5x  16.5x  13.4x  13.0x  11.9x  15.1x  
        Panel 2 - Theoretically necessary cash income (4 banks)             
  
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 
 
Interest payment 61 61 58 60 68 60 
 
Securities
a)
 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Special loans
b)
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Other liabilities
b)
 2 2 1 1 1 0 
 
Creditors - foreign
b)
 29 31 31 24 22 19 
 
Sparkassen
c)
 11 13 11 16 18 22 
 
ANB
d)
 11 6 5 8 12 5 
 
Deposits - domestic
d)
 5 6 6 7 8 9 
 
Deposits - foreign
e)
 2 2 2 2 5 4 
 
Operational expenses
f)
 54 58 57 56 38 44 
 
Dividends paid
f)
 11 10 16 17 7 0 
 
Theoretically necessary cash income (4 banks) 126 129 131 133 113 104 
  Actual reported cash income of the 4 Konzerns 74 73 99 100 103 76 
        Panel 3 - Actual debt-to-profit ratios             
  
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 
 
CA 10.9x  8.3x  6.7x  7.4x  8.7x  8.2x  
 
BCA 12.6x  10.8x  10.2x  9.3x  6.1x  9.0x  
 
UB -20.3x  -18.4x  -29.2x  -42.6x  -89.5x  -13.0x  
 
VB 9.4x  9.5x  10.1x  11.1x  7.2x  4.6x  
  BCA combined     21.6x  17.8x  15.1x  25.5x  
Note: a) Financial Compass, 1931, pp. 275-6; 1930, pp. 265-6, 1929-30 based on ANB benchmark rate; b) Same as Sparkassen rate; c) Statistische Nachrichten, 
1925-32; d) ANB Mitteilungen, 1926-33; e) Same as Deposit - domestic rate; f) Financial Compass, 1926-35, actual data for each universal bank. 
Source: the author's calculations based on Financial Compass, 1926-35 and Commercial Compass, 1925-32. 
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Aggregate Konzern performance 
Panel 1 of Table 5 applies the three-tier method to the database of the Austrian Konzern 
corporations and shows the actual debt-to-profit ratios.
48
 The four Konzerns had their combined 
debt-to-profit ratios at or above the 12x critical threshold in all years under observation. This 
suggests that they needed their banks’ active cooperation to avoid bankruptcy, as they had 
defaulted not only on principal payments, but also on interest payments. As these companies’ 
loans in all likelihood comprised the overwhelming majority of the four universal banks’ assets, 
their default must have made the banks insolvent. 
When do banks go bankrupt? They can avoid it by remaining liquid even when they are 
insolvent. When the borrower no longer services the principal and the interest on the loan but it 
still generates positive cash which is deposited at the bank (tier-2), then this fresh money can be a 
source of liquidity for the bank. As Table 4 depicts, at 13x debt-to-profit, the company has a 
profit before financial expenses of 7.7. Even if this is insufficient for interest payment and the 
company does not pay the interest from this profit, the money still sits on the bank’s balance 
sheet. Banks become both insolvent and illiquid when the new cash generated by their borrowers 
is lower than their cash expenses. This is when they enter tier-3 and their bankruptcy becomes 
inevitable. 
What was the extent of the universal banks’ illiquidity? Panel 2 of Table 5 assesses the 
conditions under which the four universal banks should have become illiquid. The calculation 
assumes that the banks were already tier-2 insolvent as they received no interest or principal 
payments on their Konzern loans. However, the banks could still remain liquid, as long as their 
Konzerns produced sufficient cash earnings which were deposited on the companies’ checking 
account held at the bank. That is, the table calculates the minimum theoretical cash income that 
was necessary for the four banks to stay afloat without outside liquidity injection. 
The calculation assumes that the cash income had to cover three types of expenses. First, 
as illustrated previously on Figure 7, 30-45 per cent of the universal banks’ total assets was 
financed through the Konzern prior to 1931. It is assumed here that the banks paid no interest on 
these current account balances. The remaining 42-59 per cent (excluding equity) of their assets 
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 Debt includes all of the long-term liabilities of the company. Profit is calculated as income plus amortization and 
depreciation to arrive at what can be most reasonably assumed to be cash profit, not accounting profit. 
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was, nonetheless, financed through sources on which the banks had to pay interest because, 
presumably, the relationship with those financing parties was at arm’s length.49 These interest 
expenses were one item for which the banks needed liquidity. Diamond and Rajan’s theoretical 
model only takes into consideration this expense category but disregards the following two, 
which are equally important in the assessment of banks’ liquidity. One of these is banks’ own 
operational expenses such as salaries, rent, taxes, etc.
50
 The other is dividends: each of the four 
universal banks paid dividends during the period which was also a cash outflow that had to be 
financed.
51
 
Panel 2 of Table 5 shows the actual figures for these three expense items. Taking all these 
expenses into consideration, the four banks required approximately AS 130 million between 1925 
and 1928 and some AS 110 million in 1929 and 1930 in order to remain liquid and survive. This 
is how much in cash profit the four Konzerns had to be able to generate at a minimum to keep the 
four banks afloat, assuming there was no Konzern interest payment. 
Strikingly, the actual cash profit produced by the Konzerns was much lower than this. As 
Panel 2 of Table 5 shows, the actual reported cash income of the four Konzerns was in the range 
of AS 70-100 million during the period and in each year it was lower than the theoretically 
necessary cash income. The challenge with the interpretation of these figures is that each year 
there were a few companies which did not supply their financials for the given year. Therefore, 
hypothetically, earnings could have been significantly higher. But only hypothetically. A deeper 
dig into the data reveals that those companies that only intermittently provided their financial 
statements were those that were struggling to produce earnings at all. In 1927 for example, there 
were 17 companies which did not report their balance sheet for the given year. Nine of these 
stopped reporting in earlier years and never continued, implying that they had gone bankrupt. 
Two of the 17 experienced a significant drop in their profit levels in earlier years, suggesting that 
financial distress was behind their non-reporting in 1927. The remaining six experienced some 
level of growth in their earnings in previous years and it is unclear why they chose to disclose no 
information on their performance in 1927. Only two of these were able to continue the growth 
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trend after 1927. If these two had reported their earnings in 1927 at the future increased level, that 
would have added less than AS 1 million to the actually reported income. This would have been 
an approximately 2.5 per cent adjustment to the actually reported earnings of the four Konzerns. 
This confirms that the whole sample of reporting companies is biased towards well-performing 
enterprises. Based on this sample, the four Konzerns produced less income than what would have 
been necessary for the four universal banks to avoid liquidity problems during the period. 
Individual Konzern performance 
The four universal banks were insolvent and illiquid at the aggregate level already in 1925. It is 
thus no surprise that they all failed. However, they did not each fail in 1925. The actual debt-to-
profit figures for the individual Konzerns in Panel 3 of Table 5 indicate that the four Konzerns 
were not equally close to the bankruptcy threshold.
52
 
The figures reveal that the Konzerns were far from the healthy, sub-6x debt-to-profit 
category. The only exception was the VB’s Konzern which in 1930 reached 4.6x. The worst-
performing industrial network was that of the UB with ratios in the range of negative 13-90x. 
This bank had unprofitable and highly indebted companies. Compared to that, the VB’s industrial 
network was a superstar, showing improvement between 1928 and 1930 and becoming healthy 
by the end. The BCA’s Konzern followed a positive trend until 1929 but it could not reach the 
sub-6x range and by 1930 its situation worsened. The CA had a consistently performing 
industrial base whose debt-to-profit ratios were somewhere between those of the VB and the 
BCA. 
Figure 8 takes an even closer look at individual Konzern performance and assesses the 
extent to which the four banks were exposed to good and bad companies. Company performance 
is defined by the debt-to-profit ratio: those Konzern members which had a 5x ratio or less are 
considered good performers; those between 6-12x are acceptable because they could still pay at 
least the interest, but those above 12x are the worst companies. Figure 8 then assigns the total 
debt (unweighted) of the Konzern companies into these performance categories and shows that 
the CA Konzern’s debt was the ‘cleanest’. Most of the companies that the CA owned and 
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financed were in the good or acceptably performing category. ‘Only’ 35 per cent of the bank’s 
portfolio was comprised of bad enterprises. While this is not a low figure at all, it is dwarfed by 
the 68 per cent ‘achieved’ by the UB. The BCA’s and the VB’s Konzerns were somewhere in 
between the two but closer to the performance of the UB’s companies. 
 
Figure 8 The exposure of the four banks to good and bad Konzern companies in 1927 based on 
companies' debt 
 
 
 
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        Source: the author's calculations based on Commercial Compass, 1925-32. 
    
Figure 9 reviews the universal banks’ exposure to bad and good performers by industry. 
Electricity was a large industrial sector, with approximately 22 per cent of the aggregate Konzern 
debt coming from here, and it included several weakly performing companies. Whereas the 
aggregate debt-to-profit ratio for the whole of the four Konzerns was around 12-19x, for 
electricity companies it was in the range of 13-25x. That is, Konzern enterprises of the electricity 
sector were more indebted and/or less profitable than the aggregate Konzern. The coal, steel and 
machine-manufacturing sector was the opposite. While this was a similarly large sector, the 
companies it included had a debt-to-profit ratio of around 5-8x. 
Figure 9 shows the four universal banks’ exposure to the companies of the weak 
electricity sector and the strong coal, steel, machine sector. The CA again emerges as the poster 
child of the Konzerns: it had the smallest exposure to weak enterprises in both sectors and in the 
57% 
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coal, steel, and machine sector, the majority of its companies had a 5x or lower debt-to-profit 
ratio. 
On the contrary, the other three banks had weakly performing Konzerns. The VB only 
had bad enterprises in the electricity sector and even in the good coal, steel, machine sector, the 
majority of its companies were badly performing. The UB and the BCA were similarly exposed 
to weak enterprises in the electricity sector. In the coal, steel, and machine sector the BCA had 
the weakest portfolio while the UB’s Konzern was better in relative terms but still behind that of 
the CA. 
 
Figure 9 Exposure of the four banks to good and bad industries based on companies' debt in 
1927 
Electricity, water, gas 
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       Source: the author's calculations based on Commercial Compass, 1925-32. 
   
CAUSES AND TRIGGERS 
What was then the cause of the four universal banks’ distress? The previous analyses provide an 
obvious explanation to the failure of the UB. This bank’s Konzern was in the worst shape among 
the four with close to 50 per cent of its companies and 75 per cent of their total debt in the badly 
performing category. Since the aggregate debt level of this industrial network exceeded even the 
total assets of the bank, this structure was simply unsustainable.
53
 It is not surprising, therefore, 
that it became distressed in 1926. 
The debt-to-profit figures of the UB’s Konzern can also account for the debacle of the 
BCA. In fact, the BCA signed its own death sentence when it decided to merge with the UB. The 
critical insight here is that the bad loans of the weak UB Konzern were not written off at the 
amalgamation or afterwards, and hence they continued to burden the BCA after the two banks’ 
merger.
54
 Whereas the BCA Konzern in itself had a 6.1x debt-to-profit ratio in 1929 - very close 
to the healthy ratio - the combined BCA (BCA, UB, VB) Konzern’s same ratio was 15.1x (and 
that was its best-performing year). The discrepancy between the independent and the combined 
BCA Konzern’s performance can be fully ascribed to the UB because the VB, which was also 
merged into the BCA in 1927, had a relatively good Konzern. In fact, the VB’s industrial 
enterprises improved on the overall performance of the combined BCA Konzern. Had there been 
no VB merger in 1927, the debt-to-profit ratio of the BCA-UB Konzern would have had an 18.5x 
debt-to-profit ratio in 1929, not the relatively better 15.1x. Further, if the BCA had acquired only 
the VB, the BCA-VB Konzern would have had a 6.4x debt-to-profit ratio in the same year, close 
to the healthy performance level. Viewed from this standpoint, the decision of the BCA’s 
management on the pursuit of the merger with the UB seems foolhardy.
55
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The figures raise the intriguing question. What was behind the VB’s distress and why was 
it necessary to merge the VB into the BCA? Lacking sufficiently reliable information on this 
matter, I can only develop two hypotheses. As Panel 3 of Table 5 shows, the VB’s industrial base 
had a debt-to-profit ratio of 9.5x in 1926, which worsened to 11.1x by 1928. Presumably, at the 
time of the merger, only the threat of the VB Konzern’s weak and potentially deteriorating 
performance was perceived, and the post-1928 improving performance could not yet be foreseen. 
Based on this information, the merger of the VB and the BCA was necessary to save the 
seemingly failing VB. An alternative explanation may be that the VB, a healthy bank in relative 
terms, was granted to the BCA for agreeing to acquire the much weaker UB. The UB was 
ravaged not only by its bad assets but also by the French franc scandal.
56
 The scandal involved a 
number of politicians, and the merger of the UB into the BCA was identified as a solution to hush 
up the matter.
57
 Based on this line of argument, the VB may have been the sugar-coat which 
helped the BCA swallow the merger with the UB. 
The UB’s weak Konzern can not only explain the collapse of the BCA but also that of the 
CA. In 1929, when the BCA could no longer sustain the UB’s Konzern, it failed and was merged 
into the CA. In that year, the CA’s independent Konzern had a debt-to-profit ratio of 8.7x which 
declined to 8.2x in the following year, suggesting an improving industrial base. However, at the 
merger, when the CA swallowed the combined BCA Konzern, bad assets were again not 
acknowledged and written off. The weakly performing companies that the CA had acquired at the 
merger thus meant a continuing burden for the bank. If only the VB’s and the BCA’s Konzern 
had been amalgamated with the industrial base of the CA, the combined three-bank-network 
would have had a debt-to-profit ratio of 8.1x in 1930. That is, the BCA and VB’s Konzerns 
would have improved on the solvency of the CA and would have strengthened the bank’s tier-1 
structure that had issues with collecting principal repayments from its borrowers, but no problems 
with receiving interest payments. Such a structure could have existed for a very long time, in 
theory, even in perpetuity. The problem hence resided in the UB Konzern. If only the UB’s 
Konzern had been merged into the CA, the debt-to-profit indicator of the two-bank-Konzern 
would have been a whopping 33.4x. Viewed from this perspective, it is clear why the 
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management of the CA resisted the merger with the BCA which was forced on the bank by the 
Austrian authorities.
58
 
The final question to address is: who eventually pulled the trigger on the four insolvent 
banks? The following analysis distinguishes between two time periods: one before the date of the 
announcement of each bank’s distress and the other afterwards. None of the four banks actually 
failed: they all decided to seek a bailout. Information on whether they were only insolvent or also 
illiquid when they sought the bailout may reveal important details about their motivations. 
Differentiating across domestic and foreign creditors is also essential to this investigation.
59
 
 
Figure 10 The reserves of the Austrian National Bank (million Austrian Schilling) 
  
 
 
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         Source: ANB Mitteilungen, 1926-32. 
  
Figure 10 presents the weekly change in the ANB’s reserves, and for each of the four 
banks, it indicates the date when the bank’s distress was announced. If foreign creditors start a 
flight, banks turn to the central bank to purchase foreign currency, and this reduces the central 
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bank’s reserves. This did not occur in the days before the announcement of any of the four 
debacles. Further, in the case of the UB, the VB, and the BCA, there was also no significant 
decline in reserves following the announcement. The CA’s case is different in this regard: here 
the announcement on 11 May 1931 triggered an enormous and continuous decline in ANB 
reserves. After this date, the flight of foreign creditors definitely contributed to the CA’s 
illiquidity. 
 
 
Figure 11 The rediscount of the Austrian National Bank (million Austrian Schilling) 
 
 
 
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        Source: ANB Mitteilungen, 1926-33.
 
The question hence still remains: in the days preceding the announcement of their 
distress, were these banks illiquid - if not due to a foreign creditor flight then due to a domestic 
creditor flight? For domestic financiers, high frequency data are only available for depositors 
(monthly)
60
 and the ANB’s rediscount (weekly, depicted on Figure 11), which together made up 
approximately a quarter of the universal banks’ financing sources. As Figure 11 shows, the 
ANB’s rediscount did increase before the BCA’s collapse, suggesting that the central bank was 
providing liquidity to the BCA. The bank also experienced a depositor flight immediately after 
the announcement of its distress. The VB’s deposits were continuously increasing right until its 
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merger with the BCA, and, based on Figure 11, there seems to be no increase in the ANB’s 
rediscount before the announcement of the VB’s merger with the BCA. This implies that this 
bank was not illiquid. The announcement of the UB’s troubles also did not trigger significant 
changes to the ANB’s rediscount (Figure 11). This bank’s deposits did decline in the weeks 
before its merger with the BCA, but by that time the bank’s distress had been publicly known for 
more than five months. This suggests that the bank’s merger with the BCA was decided when the 
UB was insolvent but not yet illiquid. The CA’s deposits were increasing prior to 11 May 1931, 
and before this date there was no change in the ANB’s rediscount (Figure 11). These imply that 
the CA turned to the ANB for help when it was insolvent but not yet illiquid. Following 11 May, 
however, within just a few days, the ANB’s rediscount increased many-fold, suggesting an 
enormous domestic flight. 
Panel 3 of Table 5 provides some clues about another important domestic creditor, the 
Konzern, which covered over a third of the universal banks’ financing sources. Unfortunately, 
these data are annual and can thus only indirectly indicate the likely impact of Konzern creditors 
on bank liquidity. The data reveal that the UB Konzern in 1926 and the BCA combined Konzern 
in 1929 had a debt-to-profit ratio which very likely made their mother banks not only insolvent 
but also illiquid. The same does not apply to the VB. The VB Konzern was in tier-1 insolvency, 
implying that the bank was insolvent but very likely it was still liquid before its merger into the 
BCA. 
Panel 1 of Table 5 shows the figures for the CA combined Konzern which in 1930 is 
equivalent to the aggregate debt-to-profit figures. In 1930, the bank’s debt-to-profit ratio was in 
the illiquid, above 12x category. Panel 2 also shows that the actual reported cash income of the 
four Konzerns dropped from AS 103 million in 1929 to AS 76 million in 1930. Since in 1930 all 
four Konzerns were already owned by the CA, this drop in earnings directly affected only this 
bank. This suggests that the CA became illiquid by early 1931 because 30 per cent of its 
Konzern’s cash income evaporated. 
High frequency data about the flight of domestic creditors thus provide conclusive 
evidence for the BCA and the VB. The data reveal that the former was illiquid before as well as 
after its distress was announced, while the latter was liquid right until its merger with the BCA. 
This supports the hypothesis that the VB did not actually fail but was a gift to the BCA for 
swallowing the UB. Evidence is, however, conflicting regarding the CA and the UB. It is unclear 
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whether domestic creditors were fleeing these banks prior to the announcement of their distress. 
What is certain is that after this date, the UB experienced some, the CA an enormous domestic 
creditor flight. 
Qualitative evidence for the CA may, however, bring a bit more clarity. The events on 8 
May were preceded by an internal decision within the CA which involved Zoltán Hajdu, a 
director of the CA, refusing to sign the CA’s financial accounts for 1930. His claim was that the 
books contained misrepresentations and he would not put his name underneath ‘until the usual 
method of drawing it up was changed’.61 Hajdu’s pivotal decision then had led to the next 
decision: to seek a bailout from the ANB. Why did Hajdu decide to break with the past at that 
very moment? James has posited that he may have developed moral reservations and simply 
could not continue with the cheating.
62
 However, since by that time Hajdu had been a director of 
the CA for five years and had most likely been aware for years of the ‘usual method’ of preparing 
the accounts, it is unclear why his conversion happened in connection with the books of 1930. 
Why not a year earlier or a year later? Based on the evidence presented in this paper, a possible 
explanation is that by the end of the financial year of 1930, the performance of the CA’s Konzern 
deteriorated to such a significant extent that it threatened not only the solvency but also the 
liquidity of the bank. 
It thus appears that at least three of these four universal banks could no longer continue 
with masking their insolvency behind liquidity and they decided to seek a bailout. Chapter 3 
argues that the universal banks enjoyed the implicit, and the CA the explicit, guarantee of the 
Austrian authorities that they would be supported in times of trouble. They thus turned to the 
ANB knowing they would be supported. 
What made the CA’s situation more complex than its predecessors’ was that after its 
amalgamation with the BCA, there was simply no bigger fish in the tank that could have supplied 
it with sufficient liquidity. As a result of acquiring the three other universal banks, the CA 
became a ‘super bank’ carrying 27 per cent of the financial system’s total assets under one roof, 
with all this amounting to 150 per cent of the total annual revenues of the state budget and 16 per 
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cent of the GDP.
63
 While the three banks that failed before the CA could find fellow financiers 
who were able to bail them out, the CA was simply too big and there was no other bank 
sufficiently large to supply it with liquidity to mask the massive tier-3 insolvency it had inherited. 
As this behemoth was struggling under illiquidity, it had no one to turn to but the state. 
ONE BAD APPLE 
This paper has emphasized the importance of a domestic cause behind the Austrian banking crisis 
in 1931. The universal banking structure heavily exposed the largest banks to Austrian industry 
through their Konzerns. When Konzern corporations performed badly, as they did during the 
second half of the 1920s, so did the universal banks. The four banks that came under distress in 
1925-31 were all insolvent from 1925 due to the weak performance of their Konzern. The paper 
has also shown that one bad apple, the UB’s Konzern, spoiled the performance of a whole bunch 
of other universal banks and caused a systemic crisis in 1931. This finding suggests that the crisis 
may have been avoidable had the UB’s troubles been adequately managed. Finally, while it 
remains unresolved whether the CA was illiquid before it decided to seek a bailout, it is certain 
that after 11 May 1931, the flight of both domestic and foreign creditors contributed to the banks’ 
illiquidity. 
Could this have been avoided? One option would have been allowing the UB to fail. The 
CA’s, the BCA’s, and the VB’s Konzerns were performing much better in relative terms. Had 
these banks not been poisoned with the UB’s Konzern, they may have survived. Their absorption 
of the UB’s failing corporations and their avoidance to acknowledge and write off non-
performing assets were what caused them to fail. At the same time, since the universal banks 
were closely interconnected through their Konzerns, they were reluctant to let one member go 
under who might then have undermined the stability of the rest as well. Not choosing this, 
however, eventually buried them all. 
Another option would have been a state bailout of the UB. Had this bank been provided 
sufficient state support to write off its non-performing assets, it would not have gone bankrupt 
and would not have had to be merged into other stronger banks whom it would gradually weaken 
and cause to fail. What made this impossible was that the state was bound by restrictions set by 
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financial markets and the League of Nations, which considered bank bailouts anathema to the 
orthodox fiscal and monetary principals of the time. 
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APPENDIX 
The number of financial accounts in the bank database 
Table A1 The number of financial accounts in the bank database - detailed 
                       
 
Compass 1926 Compass 1927 Compass 1928 
 
Total Reporting 
Non-
reporting Total Reporting 
Non-
reporting Total Reporting 
Non-
reporting 
Total 398 284 114 382 264 118 364 274 90 
Universal bank 8 8 0 8 8 0 8 8 0 
Other bank 87 49 38 75 34 41 62 44 18 
Mortgage bank 9 9 0 9 8 1 8 8 0 
Savings bank 294 218 76 290 214 76 286 214 72 
          
 
Compass 1929 Compass 1930 Compass 1931 
 
Total Reporting 
Non-
reporting Total Reporting 
Non-
reporting Total Reporting 
Non-
reporting 
Total 352 272 80 342 311 31 340 318 22 
Universal bank 8 6 2 6 6 0 6 5 1 
Other bank 48 37 11 40 36 4 39 34 5 
Mortgage bank 9 8 1 10 8 2 9 8 1 
Savings bank 287 221 66 286 261 25 286 271 15 
          
 
Compass 1932 Compass 1933 Compass 1934 
 
Total Reporting 
Non-
reporting Total Reporting 
Non-
reporting Total Reporting 
Non-
reporting 
Total 334 315 19 329 313 16 321 312 9 
Universal bank 5 5 0 5 5 0 5 5 0 
Other bank 36 31 5 34 31 3 31 29 2 
Mortgage bank 10 8 2 10 9 1 10 10 0 
Savings bank 283 271 12 280 268 12 275 268 7 
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The representativeness of the bank database 
Table A2 The representativeness of the bank database, 1929 (million Austrian Schilling) 
         
Category Source Value 
Total assets 
  Total assets for the whole financial sector This database 6,184 
Total assets for Sparkassen This database 2,213 
Total assets for joint-stock banks This database 3,971 
Total assets for joint-stock banks Weber, ‘Vor dem groβen Krach‘, p. 488. 3,800 
Total assets for the whole financial sector Statistisches Handbuch, 1931, pp. 134, 139. 4,873 
Total assets for Sparkassen Statistisches Handbuch, 1931, p. 139. 1,524 
Total assets for joint-stock banks Statistisches Handbuch, 1931, p. 134. 3,366 
Deposits 
  Deposits for the whole financial sector This database 2,606 
Deposits for the whole financial sector Weber, ‘Vor dem groβen Krach‘, p. 308. 1,435 
Deposits for the whole financial sector Statistisches Handbuch, various issues. 1,945 
Creditors 
  Creditors for the whole financial sector This database 2,693 
Creditors for the whole financial sector Statistisches Handbuch, 1931, pp. 136, 140. 2,210 
Short-term borrowers 
  Short-term borrowers (Debitoren) of the whole financial sector This database 2,858 
Short-term borrowers (Debitoren) of the whole financial sector Weber, ‘Vor dem groβen Krach‘, p. 319. 2,731 
Short-term borrowers (Debitoren) of the whole financial sector Statistisches Handbuch, 1931, pp. 136, 139. 2,275 
42 
 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
Bankhistorisches Archiv Österreichische Nationalbank. (The Archive of the Austrian 
National Bank) Mitteilungen des Direktoriums der Österreichischen Nationalbank 
(abbreviation: ANB Mitteilungen), reviewed for 1926-33. 
Bank of England Archive (abbreviation: BoEA), files OV28/1, 32, 75. 
Compass-Verlag, Compass Finanzielles Jahrbuch. (abbreviation: Financial Compass) 
Vienna, Austria: Compass-Verlag, reviewed for 1926-35. 
Compass-Verlag, Compass Kommerzielle Jahrbuch. (abbreviation: Commercial Compass) 
Vienna, Austria: Compass-Verlag, reviewed for 1925-32. 
Der Österreichische Volkswirt (in English: The Austrian Economist) (abbreviation: ÖVW), 
publisher: Walther Federn, place: Vienna, Austria, reviewed for 1928-31. 
Kausel, A., Németh, N., and H. Seidel, Österreichs Volkseinkommen 1913 bis 1963. 
Monatsberichte des Österreichischen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung, Sonderheft, 
No. 14 (Vienna, 1965). 
Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archive, abbreviation: HNA), file Z12, 
bonds (in Hungarian: csomó) 60, 128, 129. 
Nagy Magyar Compass – Pénzügyi és kereskedelmi évkönyv (in English: Big Hungarian 
Compass – Financial and Commercial Yearbook, abbreviation: Hungarian Compass), 
(ed.), Mihály Della Vendella, (Budapest), reviewed for 1925/6 – 1934/5. 
Rothschild Archive London, (abbreviation: RAL), file III/488 (a-c) Austria. 
Statistisches Handbuch for die Republik Österreich (in English: Statistical Handbook for the 
Austrian Republic), publisher: Bundesamt für Statistik, place: Vienna, Austria, 
reviewed for 1923-35. 
Statistische Nachrichten (in English: Statistical News), publisher: Bundesamt für Statistik, 
place: Vienna, Austria, reviewed for 1925-32. 
  
43 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Accominotti, O. and Eichengreen, B., ‘The mother of all sudden stops: capital flows and 
reversals in Europe, 1919-32’, Economic History Review, Volume 69, Issue 2, (2016), 
pp. 469–492. 
Aguado, I.G., ‘The Creditanstalt crisis of 1931 and the failure of the Austro-German customs 
union project’, The Historical Journal, vol. 44, no. 1, (2001), pp. 199–221. 
Albers, T. and Uebele, M., ‘The global impact of the Great Depression’, LSE Economic 
History Working Paper 218, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 
(2015). 
Ausch, K., Als die Banken fielen - zur Soziologie der politischen Korruption, (Wien, 1968). 
Bruckmüller, E. and Sandgruber, R., ‘Concepts of economic integration in Austria during the 
twentieth century’, in A. Teichova and H. Matis, eds., Nation, state and the economy 
in history, (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 159-81. 
Butschek, F., ‘External shocks and long-term patterns of economic growth in Central and 
Eastern Europe’, in D.F. Good, ed., Economic transformations in Eastern Europe: 
legacies from the past and policies for the future, (London-New York, 1994), pp. 27-
42. 
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A. Teichova, T.R. Gourvish, Á. Pogány and P.L. Cottrell, eds., Universal banking in 
the twentieth century: finance, industry and the state in North and Central Europe, 
(Aldershot-Brookfield, 1994), pp. 116-30. 
Federn, W., ‘Der Zusammenbruch der österreichischen Creditanstalt‘, Archiv für 
sozialwissenschaft und sozialpolitik, (1932), pp. 403-465. 
Feinstein, C.H., Temin, P., and Toniolo, G., ‘International economic organization: banking, 
finance and trade in Europe between the wars‘, in C.H. Feinstein, ed., Banking, 
currency, and finance in Europe between the wars, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), pp. 9-
76. 
Feinstein, C.H., Temin, P., and Toniolo, G., The world economy between the world wars, 
(Oxford and New York, 2008). 
Fior, M., ‘The financial instability of transition economies during the 1920s: the European 
reconstruction and Credit-Anstalt insolvency.’ in XIV International Economic History 
Congress, (Helsinki, 2006), pp. 119-42. 
Hertz, F., ‘The economic chaos in Central Europe’, The Contemporary Review, 143, (1933), 
pp. 326-34. 
James, H., ‘The causes of the German banking crisis of 1931’, Economic History Review, 2nd 
Ser., XXXVII, (1984), pp. 68-87. 
James, H., The Reichsbank and public finance in Germany 1924-1933 : a study of the politics 
of economics during the great depression, (Frankfurt Am Main, 1985). 
James, H., The German slump: Politics and economics 1924-1936, (Oxford, 1986). 
James, H., ‘Financial flows across frontiers during the interwar depression’, Economic 
History Review, XLV, (1992), pp. 594-613. 
James, H., The end of globalization: lessons from the Great Depression, (Cambridge-London, 
2002). 
James, H., The creation and destruction of value: the globalization cycle, (Cambridge, Mass., 
2009). 
45 
 
Jobst, C. and Kernbauer, H., The quest for stable money, (Wien, 2016) 
Kernbauer, H. and Weber, F., ‘Multinationales Banking im Donauraum: die Geschäftspolitik 
der wiener Groβbanken, 1918-1929’, Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
Geschichtswissenschaften, vol. 4. (1994), pp. 585-616. 
Kindleberger, C.P., The World in Depression, 1929-1939, (Berkeley, 1986). 
Lewis, C., America's stake in international investments, (Washington, 1938). 
Marcus, N., Credibility, confidence and capital: Austrian reconstruction and the collapse of 
global finance, 1921-31, (Cambridge, forthcoming). 
März, E., Austrian banking and financial policy, (London, 1984). 
März, E., ‘Die große Depression in Österreich, 1930-1933‘ Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 16, 
3, (1990), pp. 409-438. 
Matis, H., ‘Disintegration and multi-national enterprises in Central Europe during the post-
war years, 1918-1923’, in A. Teichova and P.L. Cottrell, eds., International business 
and Central Europe, 1918-1939, (Leicester-New York, 1983), pp. 73-96. 
Matis, H., ‘An economic background to Berchtesgaden: business and economic policy in 
Austria in the 1930s’, in T. Gourvish, ed., Business and politics in Europe, 1900-
1970. Essays in honour of Alice Teichova, (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 42-62. 
Mosser, A. and Teichova A., ‘Investment behaviour of industrial joint-stock companies and 
industrial shareholding by the österreichische Credit-Anstalt: inducement or obstacle 
to renewal and change in interwar Austria’ in H. James, H. Lindgren, and A. 
Teichova, eds., The role of banks in the interwar economy, (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 
122-57. 
Obstfeld, M. and Taylor, A.M., ‘The Great Depression as a watershed: international capital 
mobility over the long run’, NBER Working paper no. 5960, (1997). 
Postel-Vinay, N., ‘What caused Chicago bank failures in the Great Depression? A look at the 
1920s’, The Journal of Economic History, 76.02, (2016), pp. 478-519. 
Rathkolb, O., ‘The Austrian voter in historical perspective’, in G. Bischof and F. Plasser, 
eds., The changing Austrian voter, Contemporary Austrian Studies, Vol. 16, (New 
Brunswick, 2008), pp. 12-51. 
Rudolph, R.L., Banking and industrialization in Austria-Hungary: the role of banks in the 
industrialization of the Czech Crownlands, 1873-1914, (Cambridge, 1976). 
Schubert, A., The Credit-Anstalt crisis of 1931, (Cambridge-New York, 1991). 
Stiefel, D., ‘The reconstruction of the Credit-Anstalt’, in A. Teichova and P.L. Cottrell, eds., 
International business in Central Europe, 1918-1939, (Leicester, 1983), pp. 178-93. 
Stiefel, D., ‘"For better, for worse…”: the Credit-Anstalt and its customers in 1931’, in A. 
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